We consider an adverse selection environment, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. We characterize the principal's optimization problem. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements that the agent can make. We identify a sufficient condition under which these two solutions coincide.
and yet unknown to the principal. Under the standard paradigm, the agent is assumed to be capable of imitating any type of his choice. The principal's task is designing an "incentive compatible" mechanism that would provide the incentive for the agent not to imitate another type through the appropriate selection of the output and transfer levels. This would require the principal's solving an involved optimization program with many incentive compatibility constraints for each type. The standard analysis proves that motivating the agent not to imitate the "neighboring" less productive type is a binding constraint for this problem. Given these "downward adjacent" incentive compatibility constraints are binding, "monotonicity" of the output levels in the productivity of the agent is necessary and sufficient for all the other incentive compatibility constraints. Therefore a simpler program, which employs "downward adjacent" incentive compatibility and "monotonicity" constraints, has the same solution as this involved program. Once this simpler program is stated, one can easily identify the optimal output and transfer levels that solve this program.
In some real life situations, the principal faces a slightly different problem than the benchmark problem outlined above. This is due to a natural restriction on the agent's ability to imitate another type. To demonstrate this restriction we will invoke a frequently used example for adverse selection: a government's regulation of a monopolist with hidden productivity. This monopolist can misrepresent its productivity by either understating or overstating it. Concealing some productivity enhancing factors would be sufficient for an understatement, whereas an overstatement requires forging evidence to disclose non-existing factors. Under the standard paradigm the monopolist is assumed to be capable of performing either one of these activities costlessly. Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine a situation where forging the evidence is a much harder task than concealing it.
If the cost of making an overstatement of the type is prohibitively high, then it is enough for the principal's mechanism just to account for the understatement of types. In other words, it is enough for the principal to provide the incentive for the agent not to imitate the types that are less productive than the agent's realized type. Such a modification would keep the "downward" incentive compatibility constraints for the principal but eliminate the "upward" ones.
Elimination of the ability to overstate one's type enlarges the set of incentive compatible mechanisms for the principal. Therefore it introduces the potential of improving the principal's rent extraction from the agent. In an auction environment, where the principal is a seller and the agent is a buyer whose valuation for the object depends on his type, Moore (1984) shows that removing the upward incentive compatibility constraints does not change the optimal solution to the principal's problem (Theorem 1). 1 The principal in Moore's model is an expected revenue maximizer. Therefore the type of the agent she is interacting with does not directly affect her utility. Derivation of Moore's result relies on this point. When the agent is a productive entity, such as in the regulated monopolist example above, there are at least two reasons for the principal's utility to depend on factors other than the extent of the economic activity (the level of the output). First, the principal may care about economic efficiency in addition to his direct benefit from consumption of the output (The monopolist's profit function can enter into the government's utility function). Second, the output might have a quality component which is not contractible but which does depend on the type of the agent. Both of these possibilities can be accommodated by allowing the agent's type to be an argument of the value of production for the principal.
In this paper we will study an adverse selection problem without the upward incentive compatibility constraints. We will allow for the value of production to depend on the agent's type as well as the output level. In this environment, we will identify the "simpler" program(s) that have the same solution as the principal's optimization program (Proposition 2). This solution 1 Moore (1984) employs this result in his characterization of the optimal auction. Matthews and Moore (1987) , and Moore (1988) apply a similar methodology to study (i) a monopolist's optimal menu of quality -warranty pairs, and (ii) the second best contract between a buyer and a seller respectively. will generally be different than the solution where all the incentive compatibility constraints are present. We will conclude our analysis by identifying a sufficient condition for these two solutions to be identical (Proposition 3). This condition will be weaker than Moore's condition, i.e., weaker than assuming that the value function does not depend on the agent's type.
The Model
The principal is the residual claimant of the production, and the agent is the party who is incurring the production costs. Both the value and cost of production depend on the output level as well as the type of the agent. The principal can commit to a contract that assigns output and monetary transfer levels to messages sent by the agent. Both players have quasilinear utilities in money.
We assume a discrete type space 2 for the agent, {1, 2, ..., N}, and let n be the generic element of this set. The prior probability of type n is f n . And, F n = P i≤n f i is the cumulative distribution function associated with {f n }. The cost of producing x units of output when the type is n is c (x, n). This cost function is strictly increasing, convex, continuously differentiable in x and strictly decreasing in n (in other words, the agent's productivity is increasing in type).
We also make the following sorting assumption:
where the subscript 1 after a function indicates the derivative with respect to its first argument.
This condition can be also written as c (x, n) − c (x, n + 1) is increasing in x for all n.
The value of production of x units of output for the principal is v (x, n), provided that the type of the agent is n. This value function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable in x. Note that we are not stating any specification regarding the dependence of the value function on the agent's type. We assume that lim
If the type of the agent were known by the principal, the optimal mechanism would require the marginal value of production to be equal to the marginal cost for each type. Let x fb n denote the "first best" output level for type n. The first best output profile, n x fb n o , is defined by the following equations:
For future reference, note that our model is silent on whether n x fb n o is weakly increasing or not.
Benchmark: The Standard Mechanism Design Problem
In this section we will outline the problem of an uninformed principal when the agent is capable of imitating any type of his choice. The analysis is quite standard. However, since the analysis of the modified problem will follow similar steps, we find replicating the standard analysis useful. The principal's problem can be formulated as choosing the utility and output levels for each type such that there exists no type willing to imitate another one, and all types are given a non-negative utility level. Let u n and x n represent the utility and output levels for agent type n. We can write the principal's optimization problem as follows:
where IC stands for "incentive compatibility," and IR stands for "individual rationality."
One implication of the incentive compatibility constraints is the monotonicity of the output levels in the productivity of the agents. If a type is supposed to produce more than his more productive neighbor, either the compensation he receives is not enough to persuade him not to imitate this more productive neighbor, or his compensation is so high that the neighbor would prefer to imitate him. The following lemma formalizes this reasoning.
Lemma 1 IC constraints of Program A1 imply that x n+1 ≥ x n for all n < N.
Proof. Consider the following "adjacent" IC constraints
By adding these two inequalities we get
which implies x n+1 ≥ x n together with the sorting condition (1).
With the help of this monotonicity implication of the IC constraints, we will show that there exists a simpler program (with the same objective function, but with fewer constraints) which gives the same solution as Program A1.
Program A2:
The constraints of Program A2 are the "downward adjacent" IC constraints, the IR constraint of the least productive type, and the monotonicity constraints. Note that the number of constraints for Program A2 is 2N − 1, as opposed to N 2 for Program A1. It is easy to see that the constraints of Program A2 are implied by the constraints of Program A1: IC (n|n + 1)
and IR (1) are also constraints for A1. And we have shown that the constraints of A1 imply x n+1 ≥ x n for all n < N with the previous lemma. Proof. Since the constraints of A2 are implied by the constraints of A1, it suffices to show that the solution for A2 satisfies the constraints for A1 in order to prove the proposition. The proof will follow two steps:
• At the solution to A2, constraints IC (n|n + 1) and IR (1) are binding.
Suppose not. Suppose one of the above constraints is slack at the solution to A2. Then we can reduce the left hand side of that slack inequality by an infinitesimally small amount, while holding all the other choice variables constant. Such a deviation does not violate any of the constraints and gives a larger value for the objective function.
• The solution to A2 satisfies the constraints of A1.
Note that IC (n|n + 1) implies u n is weakly increasing in n, since c (x, n) is decreasing in n.
Therefore, IR (1) implies IR (n) for all n. Showing that IC (m|n) is satisfied will require some more work.
Suppose n ≥ m. From the previous step, we know that downward adjacent IC constraints are satisfied with equality at a solution to A2. Therefore, we can write the following equalities:
.....
By summing the equalities we get
By using the monotonicity constraint of A2 and invoking condition (1), this implies
which is the constraint IC (m|n).
For n < m, we will replace n and m in equality (4) to write
This time, monotonicity and condition (1) imply
which gives IC (m|n) after rearrangement.
Proposition 1 states the relevant constraints of the principal's optimization problem as the downward adjacent IC constraints (IC (n|n + 1)), the IR constraint of the least productive type (IR (1)), and the monotonicity of the output profile (x n+1 ≥ x n ). Constraints IC (n|n + 1) and IR (1) are satisfied as equalities. Given a profile of weakly increasing output levels {x n }, these equations provide the corresponding information rent levels {u n }. Since {u n } is increasing in the relevant output levels, this introduces an incentive for the principal to distort {x n } downward from n x fb n o . If the monotonicity constraints are slack, the output levels are distorted downward at the solution to the principal's problem (x n ≤ x fb n ). If the monotonicity constraints are binding, the output levels can be distorted upward as well.
Many researchers make several assumptions regarding the value and cost functions as well as the distribution of types in order to conclude that the monotonicity constraints are slack. 4 Under such assumptions, obviously, removing the upward IC constraints (or removing all the IC constraints other than the downward adjacent ones) would not change the optimal solution to the problem. However, if some monotonicity constraints are binding, removing the upward IC constraints might improve the principal's rent extraction. After all, monotonicity is an implication of both downward and upward IC constraints, and the principal is allowed to implement non-monotonic output profiles if upward IC constraints are eliminated. Therefore such a modification to the constraint set could introduce a potential of improvement for the principal. In the following section, we will be analyzing whether that potential can be utilized.
The Modified Design Problem
In this section, we will diverge from the original problem by considering a slightly different situation where each type of agent is not capable of imitating types that are less productive than himself. We will let each agent understate his productivity, but we will not let him overstate it. In other words, we will study an environment where production costs can be reported as larger than they are, but not the other way. The principal's problem under this variant of the problem is stated as Program B1.
Program B1:
The only IC constraints for Program B1 are the downward IC constraints. In order to induce the truthful revelation of the type, it is sufficient for the principal to make sure that there exists no type who is willing to imitate a less productive one. Program B1 is a "relaxed" program with respect to Program A1, since the "upward" IC constraints are no longer present.
One note is in order to justify our implicit reliance on the revelation principle. Restricting attention to truthful equilibria of direct mechanisms is without loss of generality in the context of the original adverse selection problem. However, Green and Laffont (1986) show that we cannot take the revelation principle as granted when the ability to misrepresent the type is restricted. Nevertheless, the "imitation technology" we assume in this section satisfies the condition that the aforementioned authors name as the "nested range condition." That is, an agent who can imitate type n, can also imitate all the other types that can be imitated by type n. It follows from their analysis that this nested range condition is sufficient to extend the revelation principle to our environment.
In this section, we are not able to provide an analogue for Lemma 1, since monotonicity of the output profile cannot be deduced from the downward IC constraints alone. Non-monotonic output profiles will be available for the principal, as well as the monotonic ones.
Given an output profile {x n }, we will define the functionñ (·) such that
That is,ñ (n) is the type which is associated with the highest production level among the types weakly smaller than n. If there are more than one such type,ñ (n) represents the highest one among them. Note thatñ (·) is a weakly increasing function of n.ñ (n) takes the value of n if and only if x n ≥ xñ (n−1) , otherwiseñ (n) =ñ (n − 1). Also note that {x n } is monotonic if and only ifñ (n) = n for all n. Now we will follow the same procedure we followed for the previous section, and introduce a simpler variant of Program B1 by removing all the constraints other than IC (ñ (n) |n + 1)
for n < N and IR (1).
Program B2: 
The constraint C (n + 1) does not have an immediate economic interpretation. The right hand side of the constraint is the utility level type n + 1 would enjoy if he imitated type n in the hypothetical case where type n produces xñ (n) . With the following lemma, we will claim that the constraints of Program B3 are stronger than the constraints of Programs B1 and B2.
Lemma 2 Constraints of Program B1 (and therefore constraints of Program B2) are implied by constraints of Program B3.
Proof. Constraints C (n + 1) for n < N imply u n is increasing in n. Therefore IR (1) is sufficient for the other IR constraints. To see that downward IC constraints are satisfied, let n and m be two types such that n > m. We can write the constraints C (n) to C (m + 1) as follows:
By summing these inequalities, we get
By definition ofñ (·), we know that xñ (i) is larger than x m for all i larger than m. Therefore, it follows from the above inequality and the sorting condition (1) that
Since n and m are arbitrarily chosen, any downward IC constraint is an implication of constraints C.
Programs B1, B2 and B3 all have the same objective functions with nested feasible sets.
Demonstrating that the solution to the program with the largest feasible set (Program B2) satisfies the constraints of the program with the smallest feasible set (Program B3) is sufficient to claim that all three programs have identical solutions.
Proposition 2 The solutions to programs B1, B2 and B3 are equivalent.
Proof. We need to show that the solution to B2 satisfies the constraints of B3. The proof will consist of two steps as did the proof for the previous proposition.
• At the solution to B2, constraints IC (ñ (n) |n + 1) are binding.
Suppose not. Suppose one of those constraints is slack at the solution to B2. Then we can reduce the left hand side of that slack inequality by an infinitesimally small amount, while holding all the other choice variables constant. Such a deviation does not violate any of the constraints and gives a larger value for the objective function. Therefore, the solution to B2 satisfies
for n < N.
• The solution to B2 satisfies the constraints of B3 (with equality).
We have to show that constraint C (n + 1) is satisfied for all n < N. There are two cases to consider. Ifñ (n) = n, then equality (9) above implies C (n + 1) is satisfied with equality. If n (n) =ñ (n − 1), then with a change of variables, we can rewrite equation (9) as
When we add c ¡ xñ (n) , n ¢ − c ¡ xñ (n) , n + 1 ¢ to both sides, we get
It follows from equation (9) again that the right hand side of this last equation is equal to u n+1 .
Therefore, C (n + 1) is satisfied with equality for this case as well.
Programs B2 and B3 both have the same solution as Program B1, which outlines the problem that is the central focus of this paper. The comparison of Programs A2 and B2
reveal an important distinction of our modified problem. Unlike in Program A2, the binding IC constraints of Program B2 are endogenously determined by the output profile {x n }. The exogenous ordering of the types is not sufficient to reveal the relevant constraints in the absence of the upward IC constraints. In this respect, the modified problem is similar to a design problem with a multidimensional type space (see Rochet and Stole (2003) ). Nevertheless, once the output profile is determined, the binding constraints are easily identified by the functioñ
Although it is easier to interpret the constraints of Program B2, Program B3 will also prove to be useful in deriving our remaining results. It follows from the proof of the previous proposition that all the constraints of Program B3 are satisfied as equalities at its solution.
As in the benchmark adverse selection problem, these equations would provide the information rent levels, {u n }, given the profile of output levels, {x n }. Since the upper bound on u n is given by the associated constraint C (n) if n > 1 (or IR(1) else), and the right hand side of C (n)
is increasing in the relevant output levels, this introduces an incentive to distort some output levels below their respective first best levels.
We should also note that the only output levels that need to be distorted downward from the first best are the ones assigned to the types n such thatñ (n) = n. To see this, observe thatñ (n) < n implies xñ (n) > x n , and therefore there does not exist any type m such that n (m) = n.
Similarly if the production level of a type is not distorted at the solution to Program B3, it must be that distorting the output level of that type only is not sufficient to change the information rent profile. Therefore there must exist a smaller type producing at least the same output level.
In general, the solution to our modified problem will differ from the solution to the standard problem. This is due to the fact that the upward distortions to the output levels will not be observed at the solution to our modified problem, unlike in the standard environment. However, with the following proposition, we will state a sufficient condition for the modified problem to have the same solution as the standard problem. A sufficient condition for the weakly increasing first best output profile is the weakly increasing marginal value of production in the type of the agent (v 1 (·, n) increasing in n). Note that a special case of this condition would be the value function not being responsive to the type. The corollary below follows from this observation. We will conclude the paper with the discussion of one final point. Recall that the motivation for the removal of the upward incentive compatibility constraints was the inability to overstate one's productivity. An alternative situation can be characterized by the inability to make an understatement. In that latter case, we would be removing the downward incentive compatibility constraints, rather than the upward ones. If n x fb n o is weakly increasing, the full information optimal solution is attainable as a result of this modification: Each type of agent will be assigned his first best output level ³ x n = x fb n´, and would be given a zero information rent (u n = 0). Since monotonicity of {x n } is respected, this set of choices satisfies all the upward incentive compatibility constraints. The private information of the agent costlessly "unravels" as in the persuasion game analyses of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) .
